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I. INTRODUCTION 
The coming of hostile takeovers to Japan has been 
anticipated, and anticipated, and anticipated. Each report of 
a reduction in the size of crossholdings among Japanese 
companies and in the size of Japanese bank stockholdings in 
their clients has given rise to an expectation that now, at 
last, hostile offers would emerge. It is not surprising that 
commentators looked forward, optimistically, to the arrival 
of a potentially disruptive takeover technique. The extended 
* Marc & Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia Law 
School, and Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford 
Law School. This article was originally delivered as a lecture in the 
Symposium on Hostile M&A and the Poison Pill in Japan: Prospects and 
Policy, sponsored by the Columbia Law School Center for Japanese Legal 
Studies and the firm of Mori, Hamada & Matsumoto, and retains some of 
the informality of that format. I note in particular my gratitude to Mori, 
Hamada & Matsumoto for their hospitality during my visit to Japan for 
this Symposium, and to Hideki Kanda, Satoshi Kawai, and Curtis J. 
Milhaupt for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
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Japanese recession, together with management resistance to 
internally implemented restructurings and the barriers to 
externally imposed restructurings, has created the potential 
for substantial private and social gain from rationalizing 
production. Curtis Milhaupt reports that as of 2000, 
thirteen percent of the Tokyo Stock Exchange nonfinancial 
firms traded at below their liquidation value, 1 a phenomenon 
that in the United States led to a wave of bust-up hostile 
takeovers during the 1980s.2 Nonetheless, in Japan the 
much anticipated hostile takeovers did not materialize. In 
turn, the absence of takeovers resulted in little clamor for 
defensive tactics; without a threat on the horizon, no demand 
for protection developed. 
A number of events now suggest that the long wait for 
hostile transactions in Japan may be approaching its end. 
First, Japanese corporate law has been extensively amended 
since the early 1990s to make the structure of corporate 
governance more flexible and to enhance the potential for 
meaningful monitoring of management. For example, 
merger procedures have been simplified; a system for 
employee stock option compensation has been established; 
the creation of a holding company system through spinoffs 
has been legalized and facilitated; companies have been 
given the option of adopting a U.S. style board committee-
based governance system as an alternative to the traditional 
statutory auditor system; and filing fees for derivative 
litigation have been reduced, resulting in a ten-fold increase 
in derivative litigation.3 
1 CURTIS J. MILHAUPT, A LOST DECADE FOR JAPANESE CORPORATE 
GoVERNANCE REFORM?: WHAT'S CHANGED, WHAT HAsN'T, AND WHY 
(Columbia Law School Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 
234, 2003). 
2 RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS ch.9.E (2d ed. 1995); Ronald J. Gilson, The 
Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European 
Corporate Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161 (1992). 
3 Curtis Milhaupt details the pace and scope of corporate law reform. 
See MILHAUPT, supra note 1; Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, 
Institutional Change and M&A in Japan: Diversity Through Deals, in 
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Second, a small amount of hostile activity has actually 
occurred. In 2000 and 2002, M&A Consulting, a Japanese 
takeover firm, initiated control contests directed at Japanese 
firms: in 2000, a hostile bid for Shoei Corporation, a real 
estate and electronic parts company, and in 2002, a proxy 
fight over dividend policy at Tokyo Style.4 Both failed, "in 
large part because banks and institutional investors gave 
unconditional support to existing management when the 
unwelcome bidder appeared,''5 just as they have in the past. 
Other efforts, but now by foreign bidders, have proven more 
successful. In 2000, the management of International 
Digital Communications ("IDC"), a midsized Japanese 
telephone company, accepted a stock swap with Nippon 
Telephone and Telegraph Corp. Britain's Cable & Wireless 
then made an uninvited competing bid offering slightly more 
cash than the value of the Nippon stock that IDC 
shareholders would receive under the transaction IDC 
management favored. IDC shareholders voted to accept the 
uninvited Cable & Wireless bid.6 Also in 2000, Boehringer 
Ingelheim, a German pharmaceutical company made an 
unsolicited offer for the Japanese SS Pharmaceuticals 
("SSP"). Boehringer succeeded in increasing its SSP 
holdings from approximately twenty percent to thirty-six 
percent, which amounted to a blocking position, and thereby 
gave the German company effective control. 7 
Third, informed observers, whose professional practices 
depend upon that status, are now sending a different signal. 
They now seem to be acting, rather than simply talking, as if 
these events actually herald the coming of Japanese hostile 
takeovers, which is an important signal. Professor Milhaupt 
reports that "many investment banks are no longer 
GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND 
GoVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 295 (Curtis J. 
Milhaupt ed., 2003) 
4 See MILHAUPT, supra note 1. 
5 MILHAUPT, supra note 1, at 20. 
6 Robert G. Wray, Japan: The Next M&A Frontier, THE M&A LAWYER, 
March 2001, at 1. 
7 Id.; see MILHAUPT, supra note 1, at 11. 
24 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2004 
discouraging foreign clients from hostile bids, and large 
numbers of Japanese managers are seeking professional 
advice on defensive matters."8 Of course, supply typically 
follows demand, and law firms now trumpet the belief that 
changes in the Commercial Code make poison pills possible 
in Japan.9 
It is this last point-the coming of the poison pill to 
Japan-on which I focus on here. I have expressed the view 
that the broad sanction of the poison pill in the United 
States has been a mistake. 10 The opposing view, effectively 
championed by Martin Lipton, the poison pill's architect, is 
that the pill ultimately did not discourage hostile takeovers 
because courts came to play a mediating role that gave 
target boards the ability to secure a better price but in the 
end did not often lead boards to finally block an offer.U 
While I will take up the claim that experience has rendered 
the pill benign in the United States/2 the stakes are much 
higher in Japan than they were in the United States. The 
combination of crossholdings, bank holdings and 
8 Milhaupt & West, supra note 3, at 322. 
9 It is beyond my ambitions here to track the critical Commercial Code 
changes that appear to validate a poison pill and the alternative forms 
that a Japanese poison pill might take. I note only that the fact that 
Japanese poison pills would differ formally from their U.S. progenitor 
demonstrates the importance of functional as opposed to formal 
convergence of corporate governance practices. See Ronald J. Gilson, 
Globalization of Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001). For assessments of the pill structures 
allowed by the Commercial Code changes, see Satoshi Kawai, Poison Pill 
in Japan, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 11; Arthur M. Mitchell, The Poison 
Pill Comes to Japan-Part 1, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, 
March 2002, at 1; and Arthur M. Mitchell, The Poison Pill Comes to 
Japan-Part II, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, April 2002, at 1. 
1
° For recent expressions, see Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years 
Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2001); 
Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton & Rowe's Apologia for Delaware: A Short Reply, 
27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37 (2002). 
11 See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A 
Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Martin Lipton, Pills, 
Polls and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2002). 
12 See infra text accompanying note 46-48. 
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governmental stasis that has frozen Japanese corporate 
governance leaves hostile takeovers as one of the few 
external mechanisms for systemic change that existing 
institutions do not block or at least greatly impede. Most 
important, the institutional infrastructure that ultimately 
reduced the defensive impact of the poison pill in the United 
States does not now exist in Japan. Thus, the poison pill has 
the potential to be greatly more pernicious in Japan than it 
has been in the United States, both because of the absence of 
ameliorating institutions in Japan, and because the impact 
is likely to be greater because in Japan the forces for change 
in industrial organization outside the market for corporate 
control are significantly less strong than in the U.SY 
My assessment of the coming of the poison pill in Japan 
proceeds as follows. Part II lays the groundwork for the 
analysis by putting hostile takeovers, a quintessentially U.S. 
phenomenon, in an international and functional context. 
Part III takes up the general problem posed by defensive 
tactics and Part IV considers which participants in the 
corporate governance structure police the operation of the 
poison pill in the U.S. Part V then evaluates the 
implications of the U.S. experience for the development of 
the poison pill in Japan. Part VI concludes. 
II. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: THE INTERNATIONAL 
AND FUNCTIONAL CONTEXT 
While the 1980s hostile takeover wave in the United 
States was viewed with horror outside the U.S. and U.K., 
international attitudes toward hostile takeovers have 
changed markedly in recent years. The change is most 
apparent in Europe. At the time when hostile takeovers 
emerged most forcefully in the U.S., the European attitude 
toward takeovers was extremely negative. In 1988, the CEO 
of Deutsche Bank offered a German view: hostile takeovers 
13 See Milhaupt & West, supra note 3, at 308-10. 
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were the "blunders of American capitalism."14 The following 
year, Frant;ois Mitterand, the President of the French 
Republic, described takeovers as "gangsterism and the law of 
the strongest."15 
By 2001, European opinion had shifted dramatically. In 
June 2001 the proposed Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers 
that had emerged through the conciliation process reflected a 
central pro-takeover theme; following the British City Code 
on Takeovers, 16 the Directive prohibited target boards from 
taking any defensive action that interfered with the 
shareholders' ability to accept a hostile offerP Surprisingly, 
the agreed upon text was defeated in the European 
Parliament by a tie vote, but the overall professional 
sentiment did not seem to change. Following the 
Parliament's deadlock, a "High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts," whose creation was promised to Parliament during 
the conciliation process to consider a number of issues left 
unresolved in the proposed Thirteenth Directive, was named 
and its charge extended to making a more general statement 
of what should be the Thirteenth Directive's operative 
principles. From the High Level Group's report, a revised 
directive would be crafted. 
The High Level Group Report is a remarkable document. 
First, it demonstrates clearly how much the European 
attitude toward takeovers had changed. The Report's central 
concem was not the legitimacy of defensive tactics-that 
14 Emst-Ludwig Von Thadden, On the Efficiency of the Market for 
Corporate Control, 43 KYKLOS 635, 635 (1990) (citing FRANKFURTER 
ALLEGMEINE ZEITUNG, Dec. 23, 1988). 
15 !d. (citing LE MONDE, Feb. 14, 1989). 
16 The full text of the City Code is available at www.thetakeoverpanel. 
org.uk. 
17 Proposal for a Thirteenth European Parliament and Council 
Directive on Company Law Conceming Takeover Bids, art. 9, 1996 O.J. (C 
162) 5, COM(95)655 final, revised by 1997 O.J. (C 378) 10, COM(97)565 
final. This proposal was ultimately rejected by the European Parliament. 
The current proposal, which maintains this position, was proposed in 
February 2002. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
ofthe Council on Takeover Bids, O.J. (C 45) 1, COM(2002)534 final. 
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matter had been resolved in favor of shareholder choice.18 
Rather, the focus is on the structural barriers to takeovers in 
individual countries that prevent a level playing field within 
Europe for hostile takeovers. Companies organized in 
countries without a tradition of protective governance 
structures such as dual class common stock, voting caps, or 
the right of special classes of shareholders to name the 
directors, are at a substantial disadvantage. Companies 
organized in countries with protective structures can make 
hostile offers for companies organized in countries without 
them, but would be protected against hostile offers directed 
at them. 
The High Level Group Report responds to the level 
playing field problem by proposing a "break through 
principle" that invalidates barriers to the exercise of voting 
control by the holder of a majority of the equity interests 
after a bidder acquires seventy-five percent of the equity of 
the target company (regardless of voting power), in effect 
limiting multiple voting rights to two to one. 19 Note that the 
High Level Group Report is dramatically more protakeover 
than the most favorable reading of U.S. takeover law, which 
would leave in place structural control devices that either 
predate a public offering or were approved by shareholders. 
Thus, at least professional opinion and the opinion of the 
European Commission had come a long way since 1988. 
18 The High Level Group Report affirmed the principle of shareholder 
choice: target shareholder approval was required before the target could 
take "any action which may result in the frustration of the bid ... notably 
before the issuance of shares which may result in a lasting impediment to 
the offeror obtaining control." Indeed, the Report would not credit 
shareholder approval of the creation of a poison pill unless it came after 
the hostile takeover offer occurred. Jaap W. Winter et al., Report of the 
High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover 
Bids in the European Union (Jan. 10, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=315322 [hereinafter High Level Group Report]. In the U.S., of 
course, a poison pill can be created before any offer is made and without 
shareholder approval. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 
(Del. 1985). 
19 High Level Group Report, supra note 18. 
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So what changed? The key is understanding that 
corporate acquisitions function as an equilibrating 
mechanism. From this perspective, acquisitions are an 
important mechanism for economic change and hold out the 
promise of facilitating the particular economic change of 
greatest interest to the European Union-the creation of a 
single market. 
To see this, think of a simple two-period model.2° In 
period one, the economy is in organizational equilibrium. All 
assets are owned by the entity that can most effectively use 
them, conditional on existing organizational and industrial 
technology, on the politically dictated regulatory regime, and 
on the transaction costs of shifting the use of the assets 
either by moving them between entities or altering their use 
within an entity. Between periods one and two, a change in 
technology occurs that alters the most efficient distribution 
of assets. For example, the change may be scientific, 
creating economies of scope between two previously 
unrelated technologies, or it may be political, creating 
economies of scale as a result of a reduction in regulatory 
barriers to cross-border trade, or it may be transactional, 
reducing the cost of transferring assets between corporations 
by creating a new financing vehicle like junk bonds. 
Corporate acquisitions occur in period two as the market for 
assets responds to the shift in the efficient boundary of the 
firm. The idea is simply a market response to changes that 
implicate organizational form. 
From this perspective, the market for corporate control is 
an equilibrating process that reallocates ownership of assets 
following a change in technology to the entity that then 
values them most highly. Hostile takeovers play a special 
role in this equilibration. Sometimes target management 
may resist the equilibration process. Part of the problem 
results from a good faith difference in views. For example, 
when the destabilizing change is industry wide, it may be 
particularly difficult to recognize its implications from inside 
20 This discussion draws on Gilson, supra note 2, at 163-64. 
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the industry.21 But part of the problem also results from the 
fact that even efficient change creates dislocation. Target 
management is typically replaced, target facilities are often 
closed, and levels of employment may be affected. Hostile 
takeovers are at best Kaldor-Hicks, rather than Pareto 
efficient, and target management typically will be among the 
losers. Thus, resistance to equilibration is hardly surprising. 
From this perspective, the change in European attitudes 
toward hostile takeovers is understandable. The expansion 
of the internal market, together with growing globalization, 
altered the efficient scale in many industries. Hostile 
takeovers have the potential to accomplish the necessary 
reallocation of assets without the delay and political 
posturing associated with government action. 
The same potential helps explain the perennial 
expectation that hostile takeovers are about to come to 
Japan. Describing the lengthy Japanese recession, the Wall 
Street Journal recently reported that "a combination of 
ineffectual government and feeble corporate-restructuring 
efforts snuffed out growth, which has averaged just 1.1% 
annually in the past 11 years."22 Thus, an assessment of 
defensive tactics generally, and poison pills in particular, 
should appropriately focus on whether they impede hostile 
takeovers from invigorating the equilibration process in 
Japan. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF DEFENSIVE TACTICS 
The recent amendments to the Commercial Code that 
make technically possible a poison pill-a device that, 
whatever its particular form, functions to substantially 
dilute a hostile bidder's holdings if the bidder's holdings 
exceed a triggering percentage--only frames the question of 
whether the poison pill will function to prevent hostile 
takeovers from playing an important equilibrating role. 
21 See Randall Mark et al., Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate 
Control, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 842 (1989). 
22 Sebastian Moffett & Phred Dvorak, After Long Decline, Japan's 
Economy is Stirring to Life, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at A1. 
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Most simply, the amendments do not themselves address the 
obligations of the board when a hostile bid is actually made. 
The bidder will condition its offer on the target board 
redeeming the pill to avoid the dilution that would result 
from the offer's closing. Can the board simply decline to 
disarm the pill and thereby prevent shareholders from ever 
having the opportunity to accept or reject the bid? Because a 
poison pill is only the most effective defensive tactic, 
answering this question requires understanding the role of 
defensive tactics generally. 
Whenever we observe a target firm deploying a defensive 
tactic, one or more of three motives will be present. First, 
target management may be acting out of self-interest. 
Whether motivated by keeping their own jobs or by 
protecting other stakeholders from the costs imposed by 
economic change, target management may try to preserve 
the status quo despite the fact that the shareholders would 
be best served by being allowed to accept the hostile offer. 
Second, target management may be acting as the 
shareholders' bargaining agent. In this case, management is 
using defensive tactics to negotiate a higher price from the 
hostile bidder or to seek out a more favorable competitive 
bid. 
Finally, target management may be using defensive 
tactics to influence the timing of the corporation's 
acquisition. Management may genuinely believe that selling 
the corporation at this time is not in the shareholders' 
interest and, critically, that shareholders will make the 
wrong decision even if management explains its views.23 
While the short run effect of defensive tactics undertaken for 
this reason is the same as with defensive tactics undertaken 
for self-serving reasons-the offer is defeated if the defensive 
tactics are successful-in this case the motivation is 
23 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate 
Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to the Proportionality 
Review?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247 (1989) (developing the concept of substantive 
coercion to cover circumstances when shareholders will reject 
management's advice even though management is right). 
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different: the managers believe they are acting to maximize 
shareholder value. 
The fact that defensive tactics may have different 
motivations poses two central questions at the heart of 
assessing the potential impact of the poison pill. Most 
important, how is the process policed so that defensive 
tactics motivated by management self-interest are never 
allowed, defensive tactics motivated by an effort to secure 
the best price for shareholders are always allowed, 24 and 
defensive tactics motivated by a timing claim are carefully 
evaluated to prevent claims of timing from cloaking self-
interested behavior? The critical operational question is the 
identity of the policeman. 
As I have developed elsewhere/5 the initial debate in the 
U.S. was driven by two interest groups who advanced 
diametrically opposite views. Takeover defense lawyers 
argued that board decisions with respect to tender offers 
should be treated like any other board decision concerning 
an acquisition proposal: the business judgment rule should 
operate to allocate the decision to deploy defensive tactics, 
including whether to adopt or redeem a pill, to the target 
board.26 Academics, in contrast, advanced the view that 
tender offers are themselves an important corporate 
governance device, central to acquisitions operating as an 
equilibrating process. Efficient equilibration requires that 
shareholders make the ultimate decision concerning whether 
a hostile bid will succeed.27 Interestingly, the two sides did 
24 While the appropriateness of this behavior seems self-evident now, 
in early years it was the subject of significant debate. Compare Ronald J. 
Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer 
Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982), and Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case 
for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. 
L. REV. 23 (1982), with Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
25 See Gilson, supra note 10. 
26 This view was most effectively advanced by Martin Lipton. For the 
classic formulation, see Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's 
Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101 (1979). 
27 See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The 
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 
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agree on one important thing: "courts should not determine 
the outcome of the largest business transactions in history."28 
In the end, it was the court's role to decide who would 
police management's conduct in a hostile takeover.29 Not 
surprisingly, they chose themselves despite the preferences 
of academics and practitioners. Since 1985, Delaware law 
has dictated that, in the end, the courts would decide 
whether a board decision not to redeem a poison pill would 
be credited. 30 While I have been critical of how the Delaware 
courts, especially the Delaware Supreme Court, have 
implemented the obligation they took on in the face of 
skepticism from both the bar and the academy, the impact of 
that rather poor performance has been more benign than the 
Delaware Supreme Court's rhetoric might lead one to expect. 
Even Martin Lipton, the poison pill's architect and a forceful 
expositor of the view that the pill gives the target the right to 
''just say no" to a hostile bid, recently stated: "[T]he incidence 
of a target's actually saying 'never' [to a hostile bid] is so rare 
as not to be a real-world problem."31 As I will stress in Part 
IV.C., I believe Lipton's assessment understates the poison 
(1981); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a 
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 
1161 (1981); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing 
Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1028 (1982). 
28 Gilson, supra note 10, at 496. 
29 Chancellor Chandler puts the issue more felicitously: "Corporate 
law seeks to balance the rights of the owners (shareholders) and the duties 
of management (officers and directors). Much of this balance is achieved 
by imposing fiduciary duties on management while granting only limited 
rights to shareholder to participate in business operations." William B. 
Chandler III, Hostile M&A and the Poison Pill in Japan: A Judicial 
Perspective, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 45. Maintaining that balance, in 
this view, is the role of the courts. I note that this view is not without cost. 
Particularly with respect to takeovers, if the balance point announced by 
the court is not clearly observable to those structuring transactions, then 
the judicial role becomes that of Delphic oracle. This is not an easy job for 
judges, and results in, from my perspective, the cardinal judicial sin: 
doctrine that makes transaction planning harder rather than easier. 
30 See Gilson, supra note 10, at 496-97 (discussing Delaware Supreme 
Court decisions in Household International and Unocal). 
31 Lipton, supra note 11, at 1065. 
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pill's continuing impact; however, I agree that the result has 
been better than one could have feared. Thus, assessing the 
impact of the Commercial Code amendments that now make 
the pill possible in Japan requires an understanding of the 
infrastructure in the U.S. that prevented the pill from 
operating according to its formal terms. On its face the pill 
authorizes the board to invoke a poison pill to block a hostile 
takeover and thus to create a serious barrier to the operation 
of the market for corporate control. Something outside the 
pill itself-and therefore outside the Commercial Code 
amendments-prevented the pill from achieving its 
destructive potential. 
IV. WHO POLICES THE PILL IN THE U.S.? 
As we have seen, three different institutions-
independent directors, shareholders, and the courts-have 
the capacity to police the actual operation of the poison pill 
to prevent it from being used to preserve management's 
position, and to assess management's good faith belief about 
the right time to sell the company. A critical feature of the 
infrastructure that constrained the operation of the poison 
pill in the United States is that all three institutions 
performed that function. 
A. Independent Directors 
Independent directors are the first barrier to the use of a 
poison pill to block, as opposed to negotiate, a hostile 
takeover bid. Three changes over the years since the 
Delaware Supreme Court sanctioned the poison pilP2 have 
catalyzed the role of independent directors as a constraint on 
management self-interest in responding to a hostile takeover 
bid. 
First, independent directors increased in both number 
and degree of independence. Long before Sarbanes-Oxley 
and the new stock exchange rules on independence, most 
large U.S. public corporations had a majority of outside, non-
32 Moran v. Household Int'l. Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
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employee directors. At the same time, outside directors 
came to be more independent. Directors who did business 
with the corporation as supplier or professional adviser gave 
way to directors who had no financial ties to the corporation. 
Second, the Delaware courts articulated a clear 
normative statement about the role that independent 
directors should play in evaluating a hostile takeover bid. 
Independent directors, the courts stated pointedly, are not 
merely advisors to management with no stake in the 
outcome when confronted with a hostile bid. In the takeover 
area, courts came to expect independent directors to be the 
real decision makers and "to be the controlling parties in a 
target company's conduct of its defense. Only when the 
directors appear to have abdicated their role to management 
-think of Van Gorkom, Macmillan, and QVC-will the court 
intervene."33 
Finally, public opinion and the opinions of independent 
directors changed conceming hostile takeovers themselves. 
As the gains that result from hostile takeover driven 
restructuring became widely understood, the structure of 
executive compensation changed in a fashion that reduced 
management resistance to takeovers. So long as 
management compensation had a relatively small equity 
component, entrenchment was a value maximizing strategy 
for management-a hostile takeover that benefited 
shareholders by paying them a premium for their shares did 
not benefit managers, who lost their jobs. During the period 
in which hostile takeovers became a fixture of the U.S. 
corporate landscape, the portion of managerial compensation 
that was equity based increased markedly. From 1980 to 
1994, equity-based compensation as a percentage of total 
CEO compensation increased from twenty percent to almost 
fifty percent.34 The shift to equity-based compensation 
accelerated in the 1994 to 2001 period, with option-based 
33 Gilson, supra note 10, at 512 (citations omitted). 
34 Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like 
Bureaucrats?, 112 Q. J. ECON. 653 (1998). 
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compensation more than doubling over that period.35 The 
result was to align the incentives of management and 
shareholders with respect to company operations generally, 
but especially with respect to takeovers; a premium offer 
benefited both.36 
Thus, independent directors came to understand that 
they were to be the central decision makers in dealing with a 
hostile offer and to recognize that hostile takeovers were 
part of the proper functioning of the capital market rather 
than an attack on the corporate citadel. The circle was 
closed by a shift in the form of management compensation 
that reduced the pressure on outside directors by reducing 
the financial threat hostile takeovers posed to management. 
As a result, both directors and management were less likely 
to use the poison pill as an entrenchment device as opposed 
to a bargaining tool. 
B. Courts 
The story of the Delaware court's development of the law 
of hostile takeovers is too long and tortured to be recounted 
here.37 A fair reading of that path provides some support for 
Martin Lipton's assessment that target boards in the end 
have not often used the pill to block a hostile bid. Despite 
the Delaware Supreme Court's frustratingly fuzzy and 
inconsistent rhetoric, the chancery court's decisions still 
35 Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversifwd 
Executives, 33 J. AccT. & ECON. 3 (2002). 
36 While explaining what went wrong with U.S. governance as we 
approached the turn of the century is far beyond my ambitions here, I note 
that it is textbook economics that an increase in the intensity of 
management incentives requires a corresponding increase in the intensity 
of monitoring of their performance. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, 
ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT ch.6 (1992). This did not 
happen. 
37 The early doctrinal history is developed in GILSON & BLACK, supra 
note 2, ch.17; the more recent history is recounted in Gilson, supra note 
10. Chancellor Chandler's contribution to this Symposium presents a 
nuanced account of the story from the perspective of the courts. Chandler, 
supra note 29. 
36 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2004 
fairly suggest that the validity of defensive tactics will be 
independently assessed, even if one cannot avoid the 
intuition that the opinions are rhetorically camouflaged for 
the benefit of the supreme court. Management justification 
of efforts to block a hostile bid based on a claim that the 
stock market undervalues the corporation's shares or that 
shareholders will be confused by the offer will typically, but 
not uniformly, evoke judicial inquiry into the source of those 
problems. Perhaps most important, the courts have clarified 
one critical premise: the touchstone for decision is 
shareholder value. This does not mean that other 
stakeholders are unimportant, but only that their 
importance is viewed through the prism of equity value.38 As 
Chancellor Chandler points out, this constrains, but does not 
eliminate, managerial discretion;39 stakeholder concern can 
still surface through management claims of a long run 
strategy not appreciated by the market. 
Thus, despite the Delaware Supreme Court's rhetorical 
deference to director power to deploy defensive tactics, the 
chancery court continued to make factually rich assessments 
of whether target boards were using the pill to negotiate or 
to entrench,40 surely emboldened by the fact that the 
Delaware Supreme Court has yet, now more than fifteen 
years after validating the poison pill, to directly address 
whether a target board of directors can simply decline to 
redeem a poison pill based on the belief that the company is 
worth more. On balance, the Delaware courts have 
constrained the mischief that the poison pill could have 
causedY 
38 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173 (Del. 1986). 
39 Chandler, supra note 29. 
40 The Chancery Court opinion in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore is a clear 
example of this phenomenon. 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
41 To be sure, as I have urged elsewhere, it would have been better if 
the Supreme Court had actually played the role it gave itself in Household 
International, but it could have been worse too. 
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C. The Shareholders and the Market 
Independent of legal rules, institutional investors have 
come to impose a market constraint on a target's ability to 
use the poison pill to block a takeover bid. The simple fact is 
that institutions hold a large percentage, often a majority, of 
the stock of publicly traded U.S. companies. While it is 
commonplace to note the importance of the large public 
pension funds, like the California Public Employees 
Retirement System and TIAA-CREF, large mutual funds 
also hold very large positions. For example, FMR, the 
adviser to the Fidelity family of mutual funds, alone holds 
stakes of five percent or more in 288 of the largest 1000 
American public corporations in 2000 and 2001.42 Although 
less vocally than the public pension funds, large mutual 
funds also have come to oppose the use of poison pills 
without shareholder approval. Fidelity's voting policies 
state: 
If, without shareholder approval, a company's Board 
of Directors has instituted a new poison pill plan, 
extended an existing plan, or adopted a new plan 
upon the expiration of an existing plan during the 
last year, we generally withhold votes on the election 
of directors at the Annual Meeting following such 
action. 
Fidelity may vote in favor of a rights plan with 
"sunset" provisions: if the plan is linked to a business 
strategy that will-in our view-likely result in 
greater value for shareholders, if the term is less 
than five years, and if shareholder approval is 
required to reinstate the expired plan or adopt a new 
plan at the end of this term .... 
42 Gerald F. Davis & Mina Yoo, The Shrinking World of the Large US 
Corporation: Common Ownership and Board Ties, 1990-2001 (June 2003) 
(published in French in GERER & COMPRENDRE, December 2003). 
38 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2004 
We generally support shareholder resolutions 
requesting that shareholders be given the 
opportunity to vote on the adoption of rights plans.43 
Other large fund families, like Vanguard, take similar 
positions. · 
Large shareholder antipathy to a target company's ability 
to use a poison pill to block a hostile bid favored by 
shareholders operates to very substantially limit target 
management's ability to block a hostile bid out of self-
interest. For those companies that do not have staggered 
boards, which still includes more than forty percent of U.S. 
public companies,44 a proxy contest to replace directors who 
decline to redeem a poison pill in fact may operate more 
quickly than a judicial challenge to the board's action even 
with more shareholder oriented judicial review; . the process 
of evaluating alternative strategies and seeking alternatives 
to the bid, allowed under even the chancery court's most pro-
stockholder formulation, still allows delay that could easily 
run six or more months. And even where staggered boards 
are in place, a strategy of disregarding the views of a 
majority of shareholders, while lawful when stated out of 
context,45 is hardly attractive as a matter of investor 
relations. 
43 Summary of Proxy Voting Guidelines, at http://personal.fidelity.com 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2003). There is evidence that poison pills are most 
effective when coupled with a staggered board because the board structure 
prevents an immediate proxy fight to replace the board in favor of 
directors who will redeem the poison pill. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John 
C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeouer Force of 
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 
(2002). Fidelity's voting policies also dictate votes in favor of proposals to 
eliminate staggered boards. 
44 Bebchuk et al., supra note 43, at 896. 
45 See TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 'II 94,334 (Del. Ch. 1989) (Board not required to redeem a poison pill 
even though eighty-eight percent of the target shareholders have tendered 
their shares). 
No. 1:21] THE MISSING INFRASTRUCTURE 39 
In summary, the U.S. experience has been that a poison 
pill has not frequently blocked a hostile bid, once made, from 
being considered by the shareholders. The pill will give 
target management that opposes the bid time to explain its 
position, to negotiate with the hostile bidder, or to develop an 
alternative strategy or bidder. Three critical corporate 
governance institutions-independent directors, the 
Delaware courts, and the capital market--combine to cause 
the pill to operate largely as a negotiating tool, rather than 
as a means to maintain company independence. Without 
this institutional infrastructure, however, it is a fair 
assessment that the poison pill would have materially 
interfered with the equilibration process that the United 
States experienced during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Despite this appraisal of the poison pill's impact in 
operation, it is important not to overstate just how benign 
the pill turned out to be. In this respect, two qualifications 
are especially important. First, when coupled with a 
staggered board, the pill is an effective defense, and the 
empirical evidence suggests that in this context the pill has 
allowed management in an economically significant number 
of cases to prevent shareholders from making a decision 
about whether to accept a hostile bid.46 Second, we simply do 
not know whether courts now would allow a target 
corporation to decline to redeem a poison pill in the face of 
the kind of offer that played a significant role in the 1980s 
equilibration process: a junk bond financed bust-up offer 
made by takeover entrepreneurs whose strategy is to sell the 
parts of the company to more efficient users of the target's 
assets. Because such a bid contemplates a major change in 
corporate strategy, may involve forms of payment that are 
more difficult to value, and may be made by individuals who 
are not part of the business mainstream, it is difficult for the 
courts, and I expect for the target directors, to sort out 
management's actual motive for resisting the offer. It is in 
this circumstance that a clearer standard-like the chancery 
court's position before Time-Warner that, after a target board 
46 Bebchuk et al., supra note 43. 
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has had the time to explain, negotiate and seek out another 
bidder, the shareholders have the chance to accept or reject 
the bid47-is a better outcome. And it is in this circumstance, 
likely of real economic importance because of the need for 
outsiders to make the kind of changes that are difficult for 
insiders to see, and where the transaction functions most 
plainly as an equilibrating mechanism, that the pill may still 
be a serious economic problem.48 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. EXPERIENCE FOR 
THE POISON PILL IN JAPAN 
The United States experience can provide some guidance 
for how Japan deals with the Commercial Code's 
authorization of a poison pill. To be sure, there are 
important limits on the relevance of the American experience 
to Japan. Japanese industrial organization and Japanese 
corporate governance differ markedly from that of the 
United States, which surely limits the extent to which the 
U.S. experience is transferable. Nonetheless, poison pills are 
a U.S. phenomenon, so it is the only source of experience 
that is available. Thus, while remaining attentive to the 
difficulties of generalizing from a single country's experience 
in the face of important inter-country differences, we have to 
take guidance from wherever we find it, albeit with a grain 
(or pillar) of salt. 
The first, and most important, point is hardly limited to 
the pill. Allowing the capital market to operate as a 
mechanism to force corporations to respond to external 
environmental change is an important macroeconomic factor. 
It is especially important when other change inducing 
mechanisms, most notably government, may not only be 
ineffective, but may be affirmative barriers to change. In 
this setting, the role of institutional infrastructure to cabin 
47 See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 
1988). 
48 I am grateful to Steve Fraidin for his repeated reminders of this 
point. 
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the operation of the pill somewhere short of its capacity is 
critical. 
This argument, of course, is not economics, but political 
economy. Mancur Olson famously predicted that interest 
groups with stakes in the current structures of economic 
organization will act to preserve the status quo and the size 
of their piece of the pie even if their actions actually reduce 
the overall size of the pie.49 Thus, it may be politically na'ive 
to imagine that those who favor the status quo will be unable 
to prevent a reduction in the pill's effectiveness. Certainly 
the experience in the United States, especially at the state 
level, counsels that politics played an important role in 
setting the policy with respect to defensive tactics. 50 
The second point is that the pill has "worked" in the 
United States-that is, it has been largely but not 
exclusively used to support seeking a better deal for the 
shareholders rather than simply to block a bid-because 
independent directors, courts, and active institutional 
investors have all combined to police the uses to which the 
pill actually is put. The next step, then, is to assess what 
institutions can play that ameliorating role in Japan. 
Here the courts win by default. Traditional Japanese 
corporate governance does not contemplate independent 
directors of the character that has proven so important in 
the operation of the poison pill in the U.S. And while recent 
Commercial Code amendments allow Japanese corporations 
to elect a U.S. style governance structure with outside 
directors staffing governance committees, there is reason to 
be skeptical of the impact of the change. First, Japanese 
corporate law does not require an "outside" director to be 
"independent" in the sense that term is used in the U.S.51 
49 See MACUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC 
GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982). 
50 In this respect, it likely has been beneficial that Delaware's race, 
whether to the top or the bottom, has been with the Federal government, 
not with other states. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 
HARv. L. REV. 588 (2003); GILSON & BLACK, supra note 2, ch.23. 
51 See SHOHO, art. 188 (Japan). The distinction between "outside" 
directors as defined by the Japanese Commercial Code and "independent" 
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Furthermore, early reports suggest a limited response to the 
invitation to adopt a U.S. governance structure. AB of mid-
June, only thirty-six listed Japanese companies had 
committed to adopting the new governance structure. 52 Even 
for that group, the U.S. experience strongly suggests that the 
effectiveness of even independent directors depends on a 
shared vision of their function that depends on the situation 
and requires time to develop. 
We can thus expect that the burden of assuring the 
sensible operation of the poison pill will fall to the Japanese 
courts, just as it did to the Delaware courts. And it would be 
a serious mistake to underestimate the weight of that 
burden. Because the Commercial Code amendments that 
now allow a poison pill in Japan are technical rather than 
substantive, the Japanese court will be operating without 
legislative guidance. Thus it will be up to the courts to write, 
through the accretion of judicial decisions, a poison pill 
"code" that will give transaction planners for both bidders 
and targets guidance concerning the operational rules of a 
Japanese market for corporate control. This was the mantle 
that the Delaware courts took up more than fifteen years 
ago, and which they have yet to fully discharge; most starkly, 
we still do not know whether a target board, whose reason 
for blocking an offer is simply that the shareholders may 
disagree with the board over the company's "fundamental 
value" or the appropriate time to sell the company, may 
block the offer by declining to redeem a poison pill. 53 If this 
is the performance of the commercial court with the most 
takeover experience of any in the world, the Japanese courts 
confront a serious challenge. 
directors as contemplated under U.S. law is discussed in Ronald J. Gilson 
& Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese 
Corporate Governance (Feb. 2004) (working paper, on file with the 
author). 
52 David Pilling, Japanese Shifting to Global Standards, FIN. TIMES, 
June 16, 2003, at 1. 
53 Chancellor Chandler nicely explains how the Delaware Supreme 
Court has managed this dance. Chandler, supra note 29. 
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When I delivered a precursor to this Article at the 
Symposium in Tokyo, I commented that assigning to 
Japanese courts the role of creating a code, as opposed to 
applying a legislatively enacted code to the cases before 
them, seemed an oddly common law pattern in a legal 
system whose roots lie in the civil law. Professor Kanda 
rightly rebukes this reliance on formal differences between 
legal systems, reminding us that the divergence between 
different common law jurisdictions and between different 
civil law systems may be as large as the divergence between 
the two legal systems.54 
At the Symposium, I also suggested that the abuse-of-
rights doctrine, invoked so broadly by the Japanese courts to 
protect expectations of lifetime employment from a statute 
that as a technical matter dictates employment-at-will,55 
could be used as a model to develop case law that provides a 
nonstatutory constraint on the use of the poison pill to block 
needed economic change. Professor Kanda again properly 
corrects my superficial analysis of Japanese law. My 
attraction to the Japanese courts' experience with the abuse-
of-rights doctrine was simply the court's creation of a judicial 
doctrine that restricted the operation of a statute that on its 
face was not restricted, which is the functional task the 
courts will confront in constraining the operation of the 
poison pill. Professor Kanda reminds us that what is 
important is not the particular judicial doctrine-on 
reflection, it seems odd for me to have imagined that the 
Japanese courts would import a largely labor law doctrine 
into company law-but that a doctrine be available to serve 
as a vehicle for the effort. As he suggests, the Commercial 
Code in sections 280-10 and 280-39( 4) explicitly invites the 
necessary doctrinal development by providing that 
54 Hideki Kanda, Does Corporate Law Really Matter in Hostile 
Takeovers?: Commenting on Professor Gilson and Chancellor Chandler, 
2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 67. 
55 See KAzUO SUGENO, JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 395-98 
(Leo Kanowitz trans., 1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime 
Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate 
Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 525-26 (1999). 
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"significantly unfair" stock issuances may be set aside. 56 
Certainly the term "unfair" is sufficiently empty that it can 
be filled with whatever substance the court concludes is 
appropriate. 
I offer a final, and now appropriately tentative, 
speculation concerning the· development of judicial 
constraints on the operation of the poison pill. Recently, the 
Japanese courts have struck down the issuance of shares to a 
bidder favored by target management based on an 
assessment that the issuance's primary purpose was to 
protect target management. While the willingness of the 
courts to strike down defensive action is encouraging, I 
believe analysis of motivation will prove insufficient in 
Japan, just as it did in Delaware,57 to distinguish between 
appropriate and inappropriate defensive tactics. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Commercial Code amendments that in effect 
authorize Japanese corporations to adopt a poison pill launch 
a major economy on a problematic course made even more 
difficult because, after some dozen years of recession, 
meaningful economic reform now seems to be taking hold. 
The market for corporate control holds the promise of 
accelerating that recovery by providing a reform vector that 
is not constrained by governmental rigidities. The U.S. 
experience with the poison pill provides some guidance for 
that enterprise. Of course, that guidance will have to be 
refracted through the prism of Japanese institutions to be 
useful, but even one data point is better than none. From 
the perspective of an interested academic viewing the 
Japanese corporate governance from a distance, it will be 
fascinating to watch the poison pill experience replayed in 
another system. For those of us who have been critical of 
how the Delaware courts have dealt with the poison pill, 
having a second data point will be extremely interesting. 
56 Kanda, supra note 54, at 73. 
57 See Gilson, supra note 27. 
